The Philippine Claim to Sabah: Is It Time for a War Dance? (Part 3 of 3)

Thursday, 30 June 2011 07:43

Written by Marvin Bionat

Philippine Annexation or Sabahan Independence
It is inadequate for the Philippines to present its claim only in terms of its historic and legal rights. Unlike municipal law, international law is heavily politicized. That there is hardly a consequential political force within Sabah that favors joining the Philippines is a sobering thought to advocates of the Philippine claim. The fact that there are currently numerous contending claims to being the legitimate Sultan of Sulu does not help.

With a land area of 72,500 square kilometers and a population of 3.2 million, Sabah is certainly big enough to constitute a people. For sure, the international community would want to respect the wishes of the inhabitants. Any forcible attempt by the Philippines to annex Sabah will likely be met with international condemnation as it will be a violation of a people’s right to self-determination.

The prospect of Sabah becoming independent like Singapore is slightly better, although not likely in the short term. In the early 1960s, Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal publicly advocated that if the government’s claim to Sabah failed, it should support Sabah’s complete independence from the central government in Kuala Lumpur. He claimed to have been contacted by leaders of Sabah’s independence movement who believed that their support was growing.

For decades, the local Sabah government has complained about neglect by Kuala Lumpur. Sabahans keep only 5 percent of the revenue from their exports of oil and gas; the rest goes to the central government. In addition, Sabah’s share of development allocation is disproportionately small; its educational policy is totally under the control of the Ministry of Education, which sends to Sabah teachers from Peninsular Malaysia; and huge plantations in Sabah are owned and operated by federal government agencies. The grievances are major and fuel deep resentment. However, most post-colonial independence movements are based on an overwhelming ethnic support. Singapore’s secession from Malaysia was successful, because it was (and still is) about 75 percent Chinese, while Sabah, after decades of legal and illegal immigration, is now an even mix of Kadazan-Dusun: 17.8 percent; Bajau: 13.4 percent; Bruneian Malay: 11.5 percent; Chinese: 13.2 percent; other Bumiputra: 14.6 percent; and non-Malaysian citizens: 25 percent. Calculated or not, the demographic trend in Sabah is a classic picture of divide and rule by a remote power.

In addition to the lack of ethnic power and dominance to launch an independence movement, Malaysia’s anti-subversion laws have become one of the toughest in the world. Detention without trial is allowed. Also, as states are entitled to do, Malaysia can conveniently invoke the inviolability of its territorial integrity to discourage outside support in serious efforts to dismember its territory. It will use force to assert this national right. (It should be noted here that while UN Resolution 1514 (XV) forbids secession, the General Assembly also implied in a 1970 declaration that secession may be allowed if the government does not represent the people.)

Prognosis
Resolving the Sabah problem is not an easy one. International law is not adequate to provide a quick solution. There is no compulsory judicial settlement to resolve the issue. As mentioned, Philippine annexation is hardly conceivable, at least until Filipinos loyal to the old country become a dominant political force within Sabah. Likewise, the success of an independence movement may also depend on the emergence of a dominant ethnic group.

As it is, the status quo favors Malaysia. They don’t lose anything by not doing anything, at least not in terms of negotiations. The Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu will need to build leverage to further their claim. Again, one trend that can alter the equation is demographics. In 1970, there were only 18,362 Malays in Sabah. That population jumped to 303,500 in 2001. To further “Malaynize” Sabah, former Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir granted citizenship to illegal immigrants, including thousands of Filipinos. As a result, Sabah’s population jumped from 653,000 in 1970 to 3.2 million in 2010, of which 1.7 are foreigners.

The net result of immigration trends and the government policy to absorb even those in the country illegally is a less Christian Sabah and the dominance of United Malays National Organisation, a Muslim-based political party. Early in the 20th century, the Kadazan-Dusuns, majority of whom are Christians, were the dominant ethnic group, comprising about 42 percent of the population. By 2010, they represented less than 18 percent. Now Sabah is 64 percent Muslim and only 27 percent Christian.

Key questions: Will the Muslim majority in Sabah overcome their ethnic differences and consider independence? Probably not, since Malaysia is a predominantly Muslim country both demographically and politically, and the groups that tend to call for independence are the non-Muslims. The de-Christianization of Sabah is preventing a situation akin to the successful independence movement in East Timor, where non-Muslims fought for independence powered by their ethnic and religious self-identify.

The one factor that might create a pro-independence movement among Muslims is a politically savvy Sultan of Sulu who effectively reaches out to Sabahans as their true leader. Certainly, the legalization and assimilation of Filipino immigrants from Mindanao favors this scenario. Wilfred M. Bumburing, a leader of United Pasokmomogun Kadazandusun Murut Organisation, a Christian-based party, warns of a reverse takeover of the state by immigrants (especially Filipinos), who may opt for the independence of Sabah.

If Malaysia continues to refuse to talk about the issue, it is quite possible that a frustrated Sultan might decide to reassert his proprietary claim (by nullifying the 1962 transfer of claim rights to the Philippine government on the ground that all peaceful means have been exhausted) and seek the help of the MNLF to regain its territory. Considering that Filipino Muslims in Sabah, especially the illegal immigrants, are reportedly harassed and maltreated, there is a fair chance that the Sultan can muster enough support.

The idea that Malaysian businessmen might pool a huge amount to offer to buy the territories from the Sultanate (rather than negotiate a purchase with Manila politicians) is also within the realm of possibilities. This will be like snatching Sabah from under the Philippines’ arm, but a desperate Sultanate can let it happen. The Philippines can prevent this by permanently acquiring the proprietary rights ahead of the Malaysians, also by offering compensation to the Sultan. This may obviate the dragging of the MNLF into the fray, but it will lead to a more permanent stalemate and a prolonged tension in the region.

Probably a more realistic win-win scenario, after the Philippines and the Sultan of Sulu have built some leverage (including a forceful re-assertion of the Philippine claim and the Sultan gaining more active local support within Sabah, perhaps including the mobilization of the MNLF), is Malaysia offering a more commensurate lease money to the Sultan, who in turn accepts and invests in the development of both Sulu and Sabah.

Whatever the short-term developments may be and however strong a legal case the Philippines may present, the forces of international politics is on Malaysia’s side, mainly because it has effective control over the disputed territory.

Bottom line: There won’t be a wild and crazy war dance tonight, but will building sufficient negotiating leverage to bring Malaysians to the table include firing some shots? Maybe …