One More American Century?

Monday, 23 May 2011 02:51

Written by Marvin Bionat

People should take note of what George Friedman has to say in his New York Times bestseller book The Next 100 Years. Friedman is the founder of STRATFOR, a private geopolitical intelligence and forecasting firm. The first time I heard of the company was back in President Estrada’s time, when a friend and I were discussing what might happen to his newly minted presidency. I then took the view that Erap would in a matter of time be ousted through People Power, a somewhat dubious prediction at that time considering how popular the new president was. Then I stumbled upon a STRATFOR report that made the same forecast. The firm was just founded then, and while I liked the confirmation of my view, I dismissed the report as a wild amateurish guess, unsupported by hard political data.

More than a decade later, not only was Estrada ousted as STRATFOR predicted, the global intelligence firm has earned a strong reputation for the accuracy of its intelligence reports. Barron’s has dubbed STRATFOR the “Shadow CIA,” and “predictions have made George Friedman a hot property these days,” according to The Wall Street Journal.

Even before the killing of Osama bin Laden, Friedman never considered the jihadist threat a serious challenge. He argues that the Muslim world is too divided to pose a real security threat to the U.S., and America’s strategic objective is simply to keep Muslim countries and groups fragmented. He also does not think China’s decades of spectacular growth will last for long. He expects China to play a diminished role, after internal tensions unravel the tenuous hold of the Communist Party.

The crux of Friedman’s geopolitical prediction is America maintaining its superpower status for the rest of the 21st century. He likes to cite the Mahan doctrine as a key reason; that is, whoever controls the seas controls global trade and therefore the world. Indeed, none of the world’s potential challengers to U.S. hegemony has the sea power to even contemplate confronting the U.S. naval force. America’s cultural foothold in the rest of the world also gives it a major advantage over emerging rivals like China. I suppose Friedman also assumes that, despite the rancorous political divide in Washington, the U.S. will not implode in the face of current economic problems, but it will emerge strong and poised to keep its hegemonic stature for decades to come.

What Friedman sees as the next major American geopolitical challenge is the emergence of a more assertive Russia. The new rivalry will not have the same contours as the Cold War, especially in the way ideology was the main driver, but as in most conflicts, it will be driven by economic imperatives. A Russia awash with cash from its energy and mineral exports is now selectively industrializing and re-arming, focusing on modern technological warfare. In the coming years, it will inevitably reassert its influence in Europe and the rest of the world.

One important trend that informs Friedman’s predictive analyses of geopolitics is the sucking sound of shrinking demographics and the major labor shortage that follows. In the coming decades, birthrates will drop significantly. Scarcity of labor will inevitably reverse the immigration problem from one of preventing people from entering the borders of the developed world to enticing them to leave their countries to enter the labor-deprived rich economies. This will give Mexico a significant role vis-à-vis U.S. hegemonic designs. In addition, since Mexicans heavily populate the border states, which they used to own, a strong and confident Mexico may reassert its claim to former territories, activating a security fault line too close for America’s comfort.

Friedman likes to point out that geopolitical forecasting should not be linear. In his reading of history, he sees cycles and patterns. In the U.S., for instance, he sees 50-year cycles in which a supply-driven economy is followed by government focus on demand. The Great Depression he points out ended in the reallocation of capital to boost demand (welfare state, credit for housing, interstate highways, etc.). The current supply cycle started with the Reagan presidency in 1980 and will run for two more decades before another era of demand-driven growth will be required.

Obviously, Friedman does not think individual players, even presidents, matter that much. As the giant wheel of history rolls, people may think they’re making history. In fact, it is history that’s making them.

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