Impeachment is political and, yes, legal

Wednesday, 18 January 2012 07:20

Written by Tony La Viña

This is a second column of The Corona Trial Scorecard, a series I am writing on the Corona impeachment trial now that is currently ongoing in the Senate. I began the series with a review of the experience of judicial experience in the United States. In this column, with the research and drafting assistance of Danielle Mae Navarro, a UP Law student, I review the Philippine impeachment procedure as laid down by the 1987 Constitution. A review of this procedure, and in particular its genesis and history in the debates of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the Constitution in 1986, clearly shows that impeachment is both political and legal. It is political in that the persons and institutions tasked with impeachment duties are political, but it is legal because rules, including the Bill of Rights, apply and cannot be wantonly disregarded.

I also review the jurisprudence we have had so far on impeachment as that too reveals what the process is all about and what in store for the country as the process moves forward.

Both the history and jurisprudence on impeachment shows the correctness so far of the Senate rulings in the case – the denial of a preliminary hearing requested by the Defense that would look into the validity of the impeachment complaint and the ruling denying the request of the Prosecution to compel Chief Justice Corona and his relatives to testify for their case. Clearly also, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile is on the right track when he observed last Tuesday that impeachment is akin to a criminal proceeding (although it is not).

As the members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission acknowledged, the impeachment process is essentially a political act with the sole purpose of removing the impeachable official from public office for one or more of the following grounds as provided by Sec. 2, Art XI 1987 Constitution: culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Impeachment, as held in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.

Commissioner Romulo further clarified that the impeachment “procedure is analogous to a criminal trial but it is not a criminal prosecution per se,” thus the official concerned may be subject to subsequent civil and criminal prosecutions concerning the acts complained of. Since impeachment is not a criminal proceeding per se, the principles in criminal procedure do not necessarily apply although it can involve certain judicial procedures. Thus, it is accepted that the official being impeached must be informed of the charges against him, be given the opportunity to defend himself accordingly and be tried fairly and impartially.

Given the fact that impeachment is a political act, the power to initiate, hear and decide upon impeachment complaints and cases is lodged in the legislative branch of government under the 1987 Constitution. Sec. 3, Art XI of the Constitution provides the basic framework for impeachment proceedings which gave specific tasks to the House of representatives and the Senate.

Pursuant to this, the House of Representatives and the Senate of the 15th Congress have promulgated their own rules of impeachment, Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings adopted on August 3, 2010 and Resolution No. 39 Resolution Adopting the Rules of Procedure on Impeachment Trials adopted on March 23, 2011, respectively.
The Supreme Court has decided two major cases on impeachment: the Francisco and Gutierrez cases. Both are instructive of the nature of impeachment.

The Court in Francisco v. Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, clarified that initiation of impeachment referred to in Section 3(5), Art XI Constitution “takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,” thus, the impeachment complaint 1-year time bar should only be counted from this time. This ruling was subsequently upheld in the case of Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice.

Gutierrez v. House of Representatives Committee on Justice, further held that the Rules of Impeachment to be promulgated by Congress need not be published since if the same was the intention of the Constitution then, it would have been expressly provided for. Moreover, publication is only one of the several modes by which Congress can publicly announce the rules it promulgates for impeachment. The case also held that the “one offense per complaint rule” as found in the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply in impeachment cases since the “Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.”

One question people have been asking is what is the proof needed for conviction or acquittal in impeachment cases. According to the Records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Davide sought to clarify the standard of proof needed for the Committee as basis for its determination of the sufficiency of the grounds alleged in the impeachment complaint. However, Commissioner Romulo explained that the Commission purposely refrained from delving into such issue since it would result to the impeachment process becoming more of the nature of a criminal proceeding. And this would be contradictory to the accepted fact, as mentioned previously, that impeachment is essentially a political act.
In my view, this is where impeachment clearly differs from criminal cases. The quantum of proof needed for conviction in impeachment is merely “substantial evidence”; so long as the decision of the Senator-Judges is supported by evidence, that is enough - to convict – or to acquit. How about public opinion? Does it matter in impeachment trials? Should the Senator-Judges just heed public opinion? My answer is No. Public opinion is helpful in forming the Senator-Judge’s perception of national interest but it is not controlling. If the Constitution intended public opinion to be the basis for conviction and acquittal, it should have done away with a trial and instead called for a referendum or election (as we do in recalling erring local officials). The Senate is made the sole judge precisely because the people, who ratified the Constitution, trusted them to be the one body with the long-term view of national interest.

A final point: impeachment is ultimately more political than legal because in the end conviction or acquittal must be based on national interest, on what is good for the country. But again, this does not mean the evidence is not important. I do not think it is in the national interest to acquit the Chief Justice if the evidence is there to convict him. In the same way, it is certainly not in the national interest if he is convicted even when the evidence against him is non-existent. And so I go back to the title of this column – “Impeachment is political, and yes, legal.”

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